1 - If a user had SHOW VIEW and SELECT privileges on a view and
this view was referencing another view, EXPLAIN SELECT on the outer
view (that the user had privileges on) could reveal the structure
of the underlying "inner" view as well as the number of rows in
the underlying tables, even if the user had privileges on none of
these referenced objects.
This happened because we used DEFINER's UID ("SUID") not just for
the view given in EXPLAIN, but also when checking privileges on
the underlying views (where we should use the UID of the EXPLAIN's
INVOKER instead).
We no longer run the EXPLAIN SUID (with DEFINER's privileges).
This prevents a possible exploit and makes permissions more
orthogonal.
2 - EXPLAIN SELECT would reveal a view's structure even if the user
did not have SHOW VIEW privileges for that view, as long as they
had SELECT privilege on the underlying tables.
Instead of requiring both SHOW VIEW privilege on a view and SELECT
privilege on all underlying tables, we were checking for presence
of either of them.
We now explicitly require SHOW VIEW and SELECT privileges on
the view we run EXPLAIN SELECT on, as well as all its
underlying views. We also require SELECT on all relevant
tables.
The new --secure-file-priv checks dereference any symlinks in the paths and compare the
resolved paths.
Thus the 5.0 test suite must do as the 5.1 and up and avoid using symlinks.
USING '..' ON WINDOWS
Backport of the fix to 5.0 (to be null-merged to 5.1).
Moved the test into the main test suite.
Made mysql-test-run.pl to not use symlinks for sdtdata as the symlinks
are now properly recognized by secure_file_priv.
Made sure the paths in load_file(), LOAD DATA and SELECT .. INTO OUTFILE
that are checked against secure_file_priv in a correct way similarly to 5.1
by the extended is_secure_file_path() backport before the comparison.
Added an extensive test with all the variants of upper/lower case,
slash/backslash and case sensitivity.
Added few comments to the code.
DEFINITION OF ANY ROUTINE.
This follow-up patch removes SHOW PROCEDURE CODE from the test
case as this command is only available on debug versions of the
server and therefore caused the test to fail on release builds.
DEFINITION OF ANY ROUTINE.
The problem was that having the SELECT privilege any column of the
mysql.proc table by mistake allowed the user to see the definition
of all routines (using SHOW CREATE PROCEDURE/FUNCTION and SHOW
PROCEDURE/FUNCTION CODE).
This patch fixes the problem by making sure that those commands
are only allowed if the user has the SELECT privilege on the
mysql.proc table itself.
Test case added to sp-security.test.
The LGPL license is used in some legacy code, and to
adhere to current licensing polity, we remove those
files that are no longer used, and reorganize the
remaining LGPL code so it will be GPL licensed from
now on.
Note: This patch only removed LGPL licensed files
in MySQL 5.0, and is the first of a set of
patches to remove LGPL from all trees.
(See Bug# 11840513 for details)
Reverse DNS lookup of "localhost" returns "broadcasthost" on Snow Leopard (Mac), and NULL on most others.
Simply ignore the output, as this is not an essential part of UDF testing.
privileges".
The first problem was that DROP USER didn't properly remove privileges
on stored functions from in-memory structures. So the dropped user
could have called stored functions on which he had privileges before
being dropped while his connection was still around.
Even worse if a new user with the same name was created he would
inherit privileges on stored functions from the dropped user.
Similar thing happened with old user name and function privileges
during RENAME USER.
This problem stemmed from the fact that the handle_grant_data() function
which handled DROP/RENAME USER didn't take any measures to update
in-memory hash with information about function privileges after
updating them on disk.
This patch solves this problem by adding code doing just that.
The second problem was that RENAME USER didn't properly update in-memory
structures describing table-level privileges and privileges on stored
procedures. As result such privileges could have been lost after a rename
(i.e. not associated with the new name of user) and inherited by a new
user with the same name as the old name of the original user.
This problem was caused by code handling RENAME USER in
handle_grant_struct() which [sic!]:
a) tried to update wrong (tables) hash when updating stored procedure
privileges for new user name.
b) passed wrong arguments to function performing the hash update and
didn't take into account the way in which such update could have
changed the order of the hash elements.
This patch solves this problem by ensuring that a) the correct hash
is updated, b) correct arguments are used for the hash_update()
function and c) we take into account possible changes in the order
of hash elements.
Bug #55755 : Date STD variable signness breaks server on FreeBSD and OpenBSD
* Added a check to configure on the size of time_t
* Created a macro to check for a valid time_t that is safe to use with datetime
functions and store in TIMESTAMP columns.
* Used the macro consistently instead of the ad-hoc checks introduced by 52315
* Fixed compliation warnings on platforms where the size of time_t is smaller than
the size of a long (e.g. OpenBSD 4.8 64 amd64).
Bug #52315: utc_date() crashes when system time > year 2037
* Added a correct check for the timestamp range instead of just variable size check to
SET TIMESTAMP.
* Added overflow checking before converting to time_t.
* Using a correct localized error message in this case instead of the generic error.
* Added a test suite.
* fixed the checks so that they check for unsigned time_t as well. Used the checks
consistently across the source code.
* fixed the original test case to expect the new error code.
Backport to 5.0.
/*![:version:] Query Code */, where [:version:] is a sequence of 5
digits representing the mysql server version(e.g /*!50200 ... */),
is a special comment that the query in it can be executed on those
servers whose versions are larger than the version appearing in the
comment. It leads to a security issue when slave's version is larger
than master's. A malicious user can improve his privileges on slaves.
Because slave SQL thread is running with SUPER privileges, so it can
execute queries that he/she does not have privileges on master.
This bug is fixed with the logic below:
- To replace '!' with ' ' in the magic comments which are not applied on
master. So they become common comments and will not be applied on slave.
- Example:
'INSERT INTO t1 VALUES (1) /*!10000, (2)*/ /*!99999 ,(3)*/
will be binlogged as
'INSERT INTO t1 VALUES (1) /*!10000, (2)*/ /* 99999 ,(3)*/
