mariadb/plugin/auth_parsec/server_parsec.cc
2024-12-06 20:28:46 +01:00

320 lines
8.9 KiB
C++

/*
Copyright (c) 2024, MariaDB plc
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1335 USA */
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#ifdef HAVE_WOLFSSL
#include <openssl/ed25519.h>
#include <wolfcrypt/ed25519.h>
#endif
#include <mysql/plugin_auth.h>
#include <mysql/plugin.h>
#include <mysqld_error.h>
#include "scope.h"
#include <cstring>
typedef unsigned char uchar;
constexpr size_t CHALLENGE_SCRAMBLE_LENGTH= 32;
constexpr size_t CHALLENGE_SALT_LENGTH= 18;
constexpr size_t ED25519_SIG_LENGTH= 64;
constexpr size_t ED25519_KEY_LENGTH= 32;
constexpr size_t PBKDF2_HASH_LENGTH= ED25519_KEY_LENGTH;
constexpr size_t CLIENT_RESPONSE_LENGTH= CHALLENGE_SCRAMBLE_LENGTH
+ ED25519_SIG_LENGTH;
constexpr size_t base64_length(size_t input_length)
{
return ((input_length + 2) / 3) * 4; // with padding
}
constexpr size_t base64_length_raw(size_t input_length)
{
return (input_length * 4 + 2) / 3; // no padding
}
struct alignas(1) Client_signed_response
{
union {
struct {
uchar client_scramble[CHALLENGE_SCRAMBLE_LENGTH];
uchar signature[ED25519_SIG_LENGTH];
};
uchar start[1];
};
};
static_assert(sizeof(Client_signed_response) == CLIENT_RESPONSE_LENGTH,
"Client_signed_response is not aligned.");
struct alignas(1) Passwd_as_stored
{
char algorithm;
uchar iterations;
char colon;
char salt[base64_length_raw(CHALLENGE_SALT_LENGTH)];
char colon2;
char pub_key[base64_length_raw(ED25519_KEY_LENGTH)];
};
struct alignas(1) Passwd_in_memory
{
char algorithm;
uchar iterations;
uchar salt[CHALLENGE_SALT_LENGTH];
uchar pub_key[ED25519_KEY_LENGTH];
};
int print_ssl_error()
{
char buf[512];
unsigned long err= ERR_get_error();
ERR_error_string_n(err, buf, sizeof buf);
my_printf_error(err, "parsec: %s", ME_ERROR_LOG_ONLY, buf);
return 1;
}
static
int compute_derived_key(const char* password, size_t pass_len,
const Passwd_in_memory *params, uchar *derived_key)
{
assert(params->algorithm == 'P');
int ret = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)pass_len, params->salt,
sizeof(params->salt), 1024 << params->iterations,
EVP_sha512(), PBKDF2_HASH_LENGTH, derived_key);
if(ret == 0)
return print_ssl_error();
return 0;
}
static
int verify_ed25519(const uchar *public_key, const uchar *signature,
const uchar *message, size_t message_len)
{
#ifdef HAVE_WOLFSSL
int res= wolfSSL_ED25519_verify(message, (unsigned)message_len,
public_key, ED25519_KEY_LENGTH,
signature, ED25519_SIG_LENGTH);
return res != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS;
#else
int ret= 1;
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY *pkey= EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, NULL,
public_key, 32);
if (pkey && mdctx && EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mdctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
ret= !EVP_DigestVerify(mdctx, signature, ED25519_SIG_LENGTH,
message, message_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
#endif
}
static
int ed25519_derive_public_key(const uchar *raw_private_key, uchar *pub_key)
{
#ifdef HAVE_WOLFSSL
ed25519_key key;
int ret = wc_ed25519_init(&key);
if (ret != 0)
return print_ssl_error();
SCOPE_EXIT([&key](){ wc_ed25519_free(&key); });
ret = wc_ed25519_import_private_only(raw_private_key, ED25519_KEY_LENGTH,
&key);
if (ret != 0)
return print_ssl_error();
ret = wc_ed25519_make_public(&key, pub_key, ED25519_KEY_LENGTH);
if (ret != 0)
return print_ssl_error();
return false;
#else
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, NULL,
raw_private_key,
ED25519_KEY_LENGTH);
bool res= pkey != NULL;
size_t len= ED25519_KEY_LENGTH;
if (pkey)
res= EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pub_key, &len); // 1 == success
if (!res)
print_ssl_error();
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return !res;
#endif
}
static
int hash_password(const char *password, size_t password_length,
char *hash, size_t *hash_length)
{
auto stored= (Passwd_as_stored*)hash;
assert(*hash_length >= sizeof(*stored) + 2); // it should fit the buffer
Passwd_in_memory memory;
memory.algorithm= 'P';
memory.iterations= 0;
my_random_bytes(memory.salt, sizeof(memory.salt));
uchar derived_key[PBKDF2_HASH_LENGTH];
if (compute_derived_key(password, password_length, &memory, derived_key))
return 1;
if (ed25519_derive_public_key(derived_key, memory.pub_key))
return 1;
stored->algorithm= memory.algorithm;
stored->iterations= memory.iterations + '0';
my_base64_encode(memory.salt, sizeof(memory.salt), stored->salt);
my_base64_encode(memory.pub_key, sizeof(memory.pub_key), stored->pub_key);
stored->colon= stored->colon2= ':';
*hash_length = sizeof *stored;
hash[*hash_length]= 0; // safety
return 0;
}
static
int digest_to_binary(const char *hash, size_t hash_length,
unsigned char *out, size_t *out_length)
{
auto stored= (Passwd_as_stored*)hash;
auto memory= (Passwd_in_memory*)out;
if (hash_length != sizeof (*stored) || *out_length < sizeof(*memory) ||
stored->algorithm != 'P' ||
stored->iterations < '0' || stored->iterations > '3' ||
stored->colon != ':' || stored->colon2 != ':')
{
my_printf_error(ER_PASSWD_LENGTH, "Wrong ext-salt format", 0);
return 1;
}
*out_length = sizeof(*memory);
memory->algorithm= stored->algorithm;
memory->iterations= stored->iterations - '0';
static_assert(base64_length(CHALLENGE_SALT_LENGTH) == base64_length_raw(CHALLENGE_SALT_LENGTH),
"Salt is base64-aligned");
if (my_base64_decode(stored->salt, base64_length(CHALLENGE_SALT_LENGTH),
memory->salt, NULL, 0) < 0)
{
my_printf_error(ER_PASSWD_LENGTH,
"Password salt should be base64 encoded", 0);
return 1;
}
char buf[base64_length(ED25519_KEY_LENGTH)+1];
constexpr int pad= (int)base64_length(ED25519_KEY_LENGTH)
- (int)base64_length_raw(ED25519_KEY_LENGTH);
static_assert(pad > 0, "base64 length calculation check");
memcpy(buf, stored->pub_key, base64_length_raw(ED25519_KEY_LENGTH));
memset(buf + base64_length_raw(ED25519_KEY_LENGTH), '=', pad);
if (my_base64_decode(buf, base64_length(ED25519_KEY_LENGTH),
memory->pub_key, NULL, 0) < 0)
{
my_printf_error(ER_PASSWD_LENGTH,
"Password-derived key should be base64 encoded", 0);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static
int auth(MYSQL_PLUGIN_VIO *vio, MYSQL_SERVER_AUTH_INFO *info)
{
union
{
struct
{
uchar server[CHALLENGE_SCRAMBLE_LENGTH];
uchar client[CHALLENGE_SCRAMBLE_LENGTH];
};
uchar start[1];
} scramble_pair;
my_random_bytes(scramble_pair.server, CHALLENGE_SCRAMBLE_LENGTH);
if (vio->write_packet(vio, scramble_pair.server, sizeof(scramble_pair.server)))
return CR_ERROR;
// Begin with reading the handshake packet. It should be empty (for now).
uchar *dummy;
int bytes_read= vio->read_packet(vio, &dummy);
if (bytes_read != 0)
return CR_ERROR;
auto passwd= (Passwd_in_memory*)info->auth_string;
if (vio->write_packet(vio, (uchar*)info->auth_string, 2 + CHALLENGE_SALT_LENGTH))
return CR_ERROR;
Client_signed_response *client_response;
bytes_read= vio->read_packet(vio, (uchar**)&client_response);
if (bytes_read < 0)
return CR_ERROR;
if (bytes_read != sizeof *client_response)
return CR_AUTH_HANDSHAKE;
memcpy(scramble_pair.client, client_response->client_scramble,
CHALLENGE_SCRAMBLE_LENGTH);
if (verify_ed25519(passwd->pub_key, client_response->signature,
scramble_pair.start, sizeof(scramble_pair)))
return CR_AUTH_HANDSHAKE;
return CR_OK;
}
static struct st_mysql_auth info =
{
MYSQL_AUTHENTICATION_INTERFACE_VERSION,
"parsec",
auth,
hash_password,
digest_to_binary
};
maria_declare_plugin(auth_parsec)
{
MYSQL_AUTHENTICATION_PLUGIN,
&info,
"parsec",
"Nikita Maliavin",
"Password Authentication using Response Signed with Elliptic Curve",
PLUGIN_LICENSE_GPL,
NULL,
NULL,
0x0100,
NULL,
NULL,
"1.0",
MariaDB_PLUGIN_MATURITY_GAMMA
}
maria_declare_plugin_end;