In many cases, binaries can no longer dump core after calling setuid().
Where the PR_SET_DUMPABLE macro is set, use the prctl() system call
to tell the kernel that it's allowed to dump the core of the server.
was erroneously converted to double, while the result of
ROUND(<decimal expr>, <int literal>) was preserved as decimal.
As a result of such a conversion the value of ROUND(D,A) could
differ from the value of ROUND(D,val(A)) if D was a decimal expression.
Now the result of the ROUND function is never converted to
double if the first argument is decimal.
protocol
Fixed duplicated code, same as last commit.
One could send a malformed packet that caused the server to SEGV. In
recent versions of the password protocol, the client tells the server
what length the ciphertext is (almost always 20). If that length was
large enough to overflow a signed char, then the number would jump to
very large after being casted to unsigned int.
Instead, cast the *passwd char to uchar.
- fixed wrong test case for bug 20903
- closed the dangling connections in trigger.test
- GET_LOCK() and RELEASE_LOCK() now produce more detailed log
- fixed an omission in GET_LOCK() : assign the thread_id when
acquiring the lock.
Sometimes a parameter slot may not get a value because of the protocol
data being plain wrong.
Such cases should be detected and handled by returning an error.
Fixed by checking data stream constraints where possible (like maximum
length) and reacting to the case where a value cannot be constructed.
When the INSERT .. ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE has to update a matched row but
the new data is the same as in the record then it returns as if
no rows were inserted or updated. Nevertheless the row is silently
updated. This leads to a situation when zero updated rows are reported
in the case when data has actually been changed.
Now the write_record function updates a row only if new data differs from
that in the record.
protocol
Update for function moved to new file in 5.1.
One could send a malformed packet that caused the server to SEGV. In
recent versions of the password protocol, the client tells the server
what length the ciphertext is (almost always 20). If that length was
large enough to overflow a signed char, then the number would jump to
very large after being casted to unsigned int.
Instead, cast the *passwd char to uchar.
protocol
One could send a malformed packet that caused the server to SEGV. In
recent versions of the password protocol, the client tells the server
what length the ciphertext is (almost always 20). If that length was
large enough to overflow a signed char, then the number would jump to
very large after being casted to unsigned int.
Instead, cast the *passwd char to uchar.
when logging is enabled.
Currently the partition engine doesn't allow log tables to
be partitioned. But this was not checked and the server crashed.
Fixed by adding a check in ALTER TABLE to disable partitioning the
log tables.
While working on the cause of the problem improved the way the log
thread structures are initialized before opening the log tables.
