The `SELECT 'r' INTO OUTFILE ... FIELDS ENCLOSED BY 'r' ' statement
encoded the 'r' string to a 4 byte string of value x'725c7272'
(sequence of 4 characters: r\rr).
The LOAD DATA statement decoded this string to a 1 byte string of
value x'0d' (ASCII Carriage Return character) instead of the original
'r' character.
The same error also happened with the FIELDS ENCLOSED BY clause
followed by special characters: 'n', 't', 'r', 'b', '0', 'Z' and 'N'.
NOTE 1: This is a result of the undocumented feature: the LOAD DATA INFILE
recognises 2-byte input sequences like \n, \t, \r and \Z in addition
to documented 2-byte sequences: \0 and \N. This feature should be
documented (here backspace character is a default ESCAPED BY character,
in the real-life example it may be any ESCAPED BY character).
NOTE 2, changed behaviour:
Now the `SELECT INTO OUTFILE' statement with the `FIELDS ENCLOSED BY'
clause followed by one of: 'n', 't', 'r', 'b', '0', 'Z' or 'N' characters
encodes this special character itself by doubling it ('r' --> 'rr'),
not by prepending it with an escape character.
Sometimes special 0 ENUM values was ALTERed to normal
empty string ENUM values.
Special 0 ENUM value has the same string representation
as normal ENUM value defined as '' (empty string).
The do_field_string function was used to convert
ENUM data at an ALTER TABLE request, but this
function doesn't care about numerical "indices" of
ENUM values, i.e. do_field_string doesn't distinguish
a special 0 value from an empty string value.
A new copy function called do_field_enum has been added to
copy special 0 ENUM values without conversion to an empty
string.
Problem: long and long long types mess in a comparison may lead to wrong results on some platforms.
Fix: prefer [unsigned] long long as [u]longlong as it's used unconditionally in many places.
protocol
Fixed duplicated code, same as last commit.
One could send a malformed packet that caused the server to SEGV. In
recent versions of the password protocol, the client tells the server
what length the ciphertext is (almost always 20). If that length was
large enough to overflow a signed char, then the number would jump to
very large after being casted to unsigned int.
Instead, cast the *passwd char to uchar.
Added lots of missing files to make "mysqlserver.lib" complete (bug#29007)
mysql.sln:
Let 'mysqlserver' project also depend on 'vio', else "vio.lib" will
not be linked into the "mysqlserver.lib" static embedded lib (bug#29007)
protocol
One could send a malformed packet that caused the server to SEGV. In
recent versions of the password protocol, the client tells the server
what length the ciphertext is (almost always 20). If that length was
large enough to overflow a signed char, then the number would jump to
very large after being casted to unsigned int.
Instead, cast the *passwd char to uchar.
