- Key_value_records_iterator::get_next() should pass pointer to the key
to handler->ha_index_next_same(). Because of a typo bug, pointer-to-pointer
was passed instead in certain cases.
mysys/psi_noop.c:
Fixed wrong prototype
sql/rpl_gtid.cc:
Added #ifndef to hide not used variable
storage/connect/connect.cc:
Added volatile to avoid compiler warning in gcc 4.8.1
storage/connect/filamvct.cpp:
Added volatile to avoid compiler warning in gcc 4.8.1
storage/maria/ma_checkpoint.c:
Removed cast to avoid compiler warning
storage/myisam/mi_delete_table.c:
Added attribute to avoid compiler warning
storage/tokudb/ha_tokudb.cc:
Use LINT_INIT_STRUCT to avoid compiler warnings
storage/tokudb/hatoku_hton.cc:
Use LINT_INIT_STRUCT to avoid compiler warnings
storage/tokudb/tokudb_card.h:
Use LINT_INIT_STRUCT to avoid compiler warnings
storage/tokudb/tokudb_status.h:
Use LINT_INIT_STRUCT to avoid compiler warnings
replication causing replication to fail.
In parallel replication, we run transactions from the master in parallel, but
force them to commit in the same order they did on the master. If we force T1
to commit before T2, but T2 holds eg. a row lock that is needed by T1, we get
a deadlock when T2 waits until T1 has committed.
Usually, we do not run T1 and T2 in parallel if there is a chance that they
can have conflicting locks like this, but there are certain edge cases where
it can occasionally happen (eg. MDEV-5914, MDEV-5941, MDEV-6020). The bug was
that this would cause replication to hang, eventually getting a lock timeout
and causing the slave to stop with error.
With this patch, InnoDB will report back to the upper layer whenever a
transactions T1 is about to do a lock wait on T2. If T1 and T2 are parallel
replication transactions, and T2 needs to commit later than T1, we can thus
detect the deadlock; we then kill T2, setting a flag that causes it to catch
the kill and convert it to a deadlock error; this error will then cause T2 to
roll back and release its locks (so that T1 can commit), and later T2 will be
re-tried and eventually also committed.
The kill happens asynchroneously in a slave background thread; this is
necessary, as the reporting from InnoDB about lock waits happen deep inside
the locking code, at a point where it is not possible to directly call
THD::awake() due to mutexes held.
Deadlock is assumed to be (very) rarely occuring, so this patch tries to
minimise the performance impact on the normal case where no deadlocks occur,
rather than optimise the handling of the occasional deadlock.
Also fix transaction retry due to deadlock when it happens after a transaction
already signalled to later transactions that it started to commit. In this
case we need to undo this signalling (and later redo it when we commit again
during retry), so following transactions will not start too early.
Also add a missing thd->send_kill_message() that got triggered during testing
(this corrects an incorrect fix for MySQL Bug#58933).
modified:
storage/connect/ha_connect.cc
storage/connect/ha_connect.h
storage/connect/reldef.cpp
- Add INSERT/UPDATE support to PROXY tables
modified:
storage/connect/tabutil.cpp
storage/connect/tabutil.h
- Take care of SPECIAL columns
modified:
storage/connect/filamdbf.cpp
storage/connect/reldef.h
storage/connect/tabfmt.cpp
-Typo and misc
modified:
storage/connect/odbconn.cpp
storage/connect/tabfix.cpp
storage/connect/xindex.cpp
MDEV-6281 Typo in mysql_install_db scripts
and collateral changes:
* remove mysql_tableinfo.1 and references to it (there's no mysql_tableinfo)
* for debian: create manpages for mysqlrepair, mysqlanalyze, mysqloptimize
(as symlinks for mysqlcheck.1, just as executables are symlinks to mysqlcheck)
* remove mysqlmanager.8 and references to it
* correct "very long line" error in mysqladmin.1
* simplify and fix table formatting in mysqlbinlog.1 and mysqldump.1
* fix a typo in the help text in mysql_install_db
* aria_chk: say "for Linux on x86_64", like other tools do
(not "for Linux at x86_64")
* add simple manpages for aria_* utilities
string was not an URL but a server name. Also make the dbname option
to be recignized in create (was only seached in option_list)
modified:
storage/connect/ha_connect.cc
storage/connect/tabmysql.cpp
occured when the table definition had a special column that was not skipped
from the header.
modified:
storage/connect/filamdbf.cpp
- Update some test cases to reflect a change of error message generated when
trying to update or delete a read only table.
modified:
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/r/csv.result
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/r/dbf.result
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/r/fix.result
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/r/ini.result
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/r/vec.result
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/t/csv.test
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/t/dbf.test
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/t/fix.test
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/t/ini.test
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/t/vec.test
Do not put version in XML files header
Remove HTON_NO_PARTITION for testing
Fix a wrong return (instead of DBUG_RETURN) in index_init
Plus a few typos
modified:
storage/connect/connect.cc
storage/connect/filter.cpp
storage/connect/ha_connect.cc
storage/connect/maputil.cpp
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/r/alter_xml.result
storage/connect/mysql-test/connect/r/xml.result
storage/connect/table.cpp
storage/connect/tabxml.cpp
storage/connect/xindex.cpp
storage/connect/xindex.h
storage/connect/xtable.h
on select from I_S.INNODB_CHANGED_PAGES
Analysis: limit_lsn_range_from_condition() incorrectly parses
start_lsn and/or end_lsn conditions.
Fix from SergeyP. Added some test cases.
Description: Using the temporary file vulnerability an
attacker can create a file with arbitrary content at a
location of his choice. This can be used to create the
file /var/lib/mysql/my.cnf, which will be read as a
configuration file by MySQL, because it is located in the
home directory of the mysql user. With this configuration
file, the attacker can specify his own plugin_dir variable,
which then allows him to load arbitrary code via
"INSTALL PLUGIN...".
Analysis: While creating the ".TMD" file we are not checking
if the file is already exits or not in mi_repair() function.
And we are truncating if the ".TMD" file exits and going ahead
This is creating the security breach.
Fix: We need to use O_EXCL flag along with O_RDWR and O_TRUNC
which will make sure if any user creates ".TMD" file, will
fails the repair table with "cannot create ".TMD" file error".
Actually we are initialing "param.tmpfile_createflag" member
with O_RDWR | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL in myisamchk_init(). And we
are modifying it in ha_myisam::repair() to O_RDWR | O_TRUNC.
So, we need to remove the line which is modifying the
"param.tmpfile_createflag".
