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Diffstat (limited to 'signaling-server/node_modules/socket.io/node_modules/socket.io-client/lib/vendor/web-socket-js/flash-src/com/hurlant/crypto/tls/TLSEngine.as')
-rw-r--r--signaling-server/node_modules/socket.io/node_modules/socket.io-client/lib/vendor/web-socket-js/flash-src/com/hurlant/crypto/tls/TLSEngine.as895
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diff --git a/signaling-server/node_modules/socket.io/node_modules/socket.io-client/lib/vendor/web-socket-js/flash-src/com/hurlant/crypto/tls/TLSEngine.as b/signaling-server/node_modules/socket.io/node_modules/socket.io-client/lib/vendor/web-socket-js/flash-src/com/hurlant/crypto/tls/TLSEngine.as
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@@ -0,0 +1,895 @@
+/**
+ * TLSEngine
+ *
+ * A TLS protocol implementation.
+ * See comment below for some details.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Henri Torgemane
+ *
+ * Patched(heavily) by Bobby Parker (shortwave@gmail.com)
+ *
+ * See LICENSE.txt for full license information.
+ */
+package com.hurlant.crypto.tls {
+ import com.hurlant.crypto.cert.X509Certificate;
+ import com.hurlant.crypto.cert.X509CertificateCollection;
+ import com.hurlant.crypto.prng.Random;
+ import com.hurlant.util.ArrayUtil;
+ import com.hurlant.util.Hex;
+
+ import flash.events.Event;
+ import flash.events.EventDispatcher;
+ import flash.events.ProgressEvent;
+ import flash.utils.ByteArray;
+ import flash.utils.IDataInput;
+ import flash.utils.IDataOutput;
+ import flash.utils.clearTimeout;
+ import flash.utils.setTimeout;
+ import com.hurlant.crypto.prng.ARC4;
+
+
+ [Event(name="close", type="flash.events.Event")]
+ [Event(name="socketData", type="flash.events.ProgressEvent")]
+ [Event(name="ready", type="com.hurlant.crypto.tls.TLSEvent")]
+ [Event(name="data", type="com.hurlant.crypto.tls.TLSEvent")]
+
+ /**
+ * The heart of the TLS protocol.
+ * This class can work in server or client mode.
+ *
+ * This doesn't fully implement the TLS protocol.
+ *
+ * Things missing that I'd like to add:
+ * - support for client-side certificates
+ * - general code clean-up to make sure we don't have gaping securite holes
+ *
+ * Things that aren't there that I won't add:
+ * - support for "export" cypher suites (deprecated in later TLS versions)
+ * - support for "anon" cypher suites (deprecated in later TLS versions)
+ *
+ * Things that I'm unsure about adding later:
+ * - compression. Compressing encrypted streams is barely worth the CPU cycles.
+ * - diffie-hellman based key exchange mechanisms. Nifty, but would we miss it?
+ *
+ * @author henri
+ *
+ */
+ public class TLSEngine extends EventDispatcher {
+
+ public static const SERVER:uint = 0;
+ public static const CLIENT:uint = 1;
+ public var protocol_version:uint;
+
+
+
+ private static const PROTOCOL_HANDSHAKE:uint = 22;
+ private static const PROTOCOL_ALERT:uint = 21;
+ private static const PROTOCOL_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:uint = 20;
+ private static const PROTOCOL_APPLICATION_DATA:uint = 23;
+
+
+ private static const STATE_NEW:uint = 0; // brand new. nothing happened yet
+ private static const STATE_NEGOTIATING:uint = 1; // we're figuring out what to use
+ private static const STATE_READY:uint = 2; // we're ready for AppData stuff to go over us.
+ private static const STATE_CLOSED:uint = 3; // we're done done.
+
+ private var _entity:uint; // SERVER | CLIENT
+ private var _config:TLSConfig;
+
+ private var _state:uint;
+
+ private var _securityParameters:ISecurityParameters;
+
+ private var _currentReadState:IConnectionState;
+ private var _currentWriteState:IConnectionState;
+ private var _pendingReadState:IConnectionState;
+ private var _pendingWriteState:IConnectionState;
+
+ private var _handshakePayloads:ByteArray;
+ private var _handshakeRecords:ByteArray; // For client-side certificate verify
+
+ private var _iStream:IDataInput;
+ private var _oStream:IDataOutput;
+
+ // temporary store for X509 certs received by this engine.
+ private var _store:X509CertificateCollection;
+ // the main certificate received from the other side.
+ private var _otherCertificate:X509Certificate;
+
+ public function get peerCertificate() : X509Certificate {
+ return _otherCertificate;
+ }
+ // If this isn't null, we expect this identity to be found in the Cert's Subject CN.
+ private var _otherIdentity:String;
+
+ // The client-side cert
+ private var _myCertficate:X509Certificate;
+ // My Identity
+ private var _myIdentity:String;
+
+ /**
+ *
+ * @param config A TLSConfig instance describing how we're supposed to work
+ * @param iStream An input stream to read TLS data from
+ * @param oStream An output stream to write TLS data to
+ * @param otherIdentity An optional identifier. If set, this will be checked against the Subject CN of the other side's certificate.
+ *
+ */
+ function TLSEngine(config:TLSConfig, iStream:IDataInput, oStream:IDataOutput, otherIdentity:String = null) {
+ _entity = config.entity;
+ _config = config;
+ _iStream = iStream;
+ _oStream = oStream;
+ _otherIdentity = otherIdentity;
+
+ _state = STATE_NEW;
+
+ // Pick the right set of callbacks
+ _entityHandshakeHandlers = _entity == CLIENT ? handshakeHandlersClient : handshakeHandlersServer;
+
+ // setting up new security parameters needs to be controlled by...something.
+ if (_config.version == SSLSecurityParameters.PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
+ _securityParameters = new SSLSecurityParameters(_entity);
+ } else {
+ _securityParameters = new TLSSecurityParameters(_entity, _config.certificate, _config.privateKey);
+ }
+ protocol_version = _config.version;
+
+ // So this...why is it here, other than to preclude a possible null pointer situation?
+ var states:Object = _securityParameters.getConnectionStates();
+
+ _currentReadState = states.read;
+ _currentWriteState = states.write;
+
+ _handshakePayloads = new ByteArray;
+
+ _store = new X509CertificateCollection;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * This starts the TLS negotiation for a TLS Client.
+ *
+ * This is a no-op for a TLS Server.
+ *
+ */
+ public function start():void {
+ if (_entity == CLIENT) {
+ try {
+ startHandshake();
+ } catch (e:TLSError) {
+ handleTLSError(e);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ public function dataAvailable(e:* = null):void {
+ if (_state == STATE_CLOSED) return; // ignore
+ try {
+ parseRecord(_iStream);
+ } catch (e:TLSError) {
+ handleTLSError(e);
+ }
+ }
+
+ public function close(e:TLSError = null):void {
+ if (_state == STATE_CLOSED) return; // ignore
+ // ok. send an Alert to let the peer know
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ if (e==null && _state != STATE_READY) {
+ // use canceled while handshaking. be nice about it
+ rec[0] = 1;
+ rec[1] = TLSError.user_canceled;
+ sendRecord(PROTOCOL_ALERT, rec);
+ }
+ rec[0] = 2;
+ if (e == null) {
+ rec[1] = TLSError.close_notify;
+ } else {
+ rec[1] = e.errorID;
+ trace("TLSEngine shutdown triggered by "+e);
+ }
+ sendRecord(PROTOCOL_ALERT, rec);
+
+ _state = STATE_CLOSED;
+ dispatchEvent(new Event(Event.CLOSE));
+ }
+
+ private var _packetQueue:Array = [];
+ private function parseRecord(stream:IDataInput):void {
+ var p:ByteArray;
+ while(_state!=STATE_CLOSED && stream.bytesAvailable>4) {
+
+ if (_packetQueue.length>0) {
+ var packet:Object = _packetQueue.shift();
+ p = packet.data;
+ if (stream.bytesAvailable+p.length>=packet.length) {
+ // we have a whole packet. put together.
+ stream.readBytes(p, p.length, packet.length-p.length);
+ parseOneRecord(packet.type, packet.length, p);
+ // do another loop to parse any leftover record
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ // not enough. grab the data and park it.
+ stream.readBytes(p, p.length, stream.bytesAvailable);
+ _packetQueue.push(packet);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ var type:uint = stream.readByte();
+ var ver:uint = stream.readShort();
+ var length:uint = stream.readShort();
+ if (length>16384+2048) { // support compression and encryption overhead.
+ throw new TLSError("Excessive TLS Record length: "+length, TLSError.record_overflow);
+ }
+ // Can pretty much assume that if I'm here, I've got a default config, so let's use it.
+ if (ver != _securityParameters.version ) {
+ throw new TLSError("Unsupported TLS version: "+ver.toString(16), TLSError.protocol_version);
+ }
+
+ p = new ByteArray;
+ var actualLength:uint = Math.min(stream.bytesAvailable, length);
+ stream.readBytes(p, 0, actualLength);
+ if (actualLength == length) {
+ parseOneRecord(type, length, p);
+ } else {
+ _packetQueue.push({type:type, length:length, data:p});
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ // Protocol handler map, provides a mapping of protocol types to individual packet handlers
+ private var protocolHandlers:Object = { 23 : parseApplicationData, // PROTOCOL_APPLICATION_DATA
+ 22 : parseHandshake, // PROTOCOL_HANDSHAKE
+ 21 : parseAlert, // PROTOCOL_ALERT
+ 20 : parseChangeCipherSpec }; // PROTOCOL_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+
+ /**
+ * Modified to support the notion of a handler map(see above ), since it makes for better clarity (IMHO of course).
+ */
+ private function parseOneRecord(type:uint, length:uint, p:ByteArray):void {
+ p = _currentReadState.decrypt(type, length, p);
+ if (p.length>16384) {
+ throw new TLSError("Excessive Decrypted TLS Record length: "+p.length, TLSError.record_overflow);
+ }
+ if (protocolHandlers.hasOwnProperty( type )) {
+ while( p != null)
+ p = protocolHandlers[ type ]( p );
+ } else {
+ throw new TLSError("Unsupported TLS Record Content Type: "+type.toString( 16 ), TLSError.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ///////// handshake handling
+ // session identifier
+ // peer certificate
+ // compression method
+ // cipher spec
+ // master secret
+ // is resumable
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_HELLO_REQUEST:uint = 0;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO:uint = 1;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO:uint = 2;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE:uint = 11;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:uint = 12;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:uint = 13;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_HELLO_DONE:uint = 14;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:uint = 15;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:uint = 16;
+ private static const HANDSHAKE_FINISHED:uint = 20;
+
+ // Server handshake handler map
+ private var handshakeHandlersServer:Object = { 0 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_HELLO_REQUEST
+ 1 : parseHandshakeClientHello, // HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
+ 2 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO
+ 11 : loadCertificates, // HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE
+ 12 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
+ 13 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ 14 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_HELLO_DONE
+ 15 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
+ 16 : parseHandshakeClientKeyExchange, // HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
+ 20 : verifyHandshake // HANDSHAKE_FINISHED
+ };
+
+ // Client handshake handler map
+ private var handshakeHandlersClient:Object = { 0 : parseHandshakeHello, // HANDSHAKE_HELLO_REQUEST
+ 1 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
+ 2 : parseHandshakeServerHello, // HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO
+ 11 : loadCertificates, // HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE
+ 12 : parseServerKeyExchange, // HANDSHAKE_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
+ 13 : setStateRespondWithCertificate, // HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE
+ 14 : sendClientAck, // HANDSHAKE_HELLO_DONE
+ 15 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
+ 16 : notifyStateError, // HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
+ 20 : verifyHandshake // HANDSHAKE_FINISHED
+ };
+ private var _entityHandshakeHandlers:Object;
+ private var _handshakeCanContinue:Boolean = true; // For handling cases where I might need to pause processing during a handshake (cert issues, etc.).
+ private var _handshakeQueue:Array = [];
+ /**
+ * The handshake is always started by the client.
+ */
+ private function startHandshake():void {
+ _state = STATE_NEGOTIATING;
+ // reset some other handshake state. XXX
+ sendClientHello();
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Handle the incoming handshake packet.
+ *
+ */
+ private function parseHandshake(p:ByteArray):ByteArray {
+
+ if (p.length<4) {
+ trace("Handshake packet is way too short. bailing.");
+ return null;
+ }
+
+ p.position = 0;
+
+ var rec:ByteArray = p;
+ var type:uint = rec.readUnsignedByte();
+ var tmp:uint = rec.readUnsignedByte();
+ var length:uint = (tmp<<16) | rec.readUnsignedShort();
+ if (length+4>p.length) {
+ // partial read.
+ trace("Handshake packet is incomplete. bailing.");
+ return null;
+ }
+
+ // we need to copy the record, to have a valid FINISHED exchange.
+ if (type!=HANDSHAKE_FINISHED) {
+ _handshakePayloads.writeBytes(p, 0, length+4);
+ }
+
+ // Surf the handler map and find the right handler for this handshake packet type.
+ // I modified the individual handlers so they encapsulate all possible knowledge
+ // about the incoming packet type, so no previous handling or massaging of the data
+ // is required, as was the case using the switch statement. BP
+ if (_entityHandshakeHandlers.hasOwnProperty( type )) {
+ if (_entityHandshakeHandlers[ type ] is Function)
+ _entityHandshakeHandlers[ type ]( rec );
+ } else {
+ throw new TLSError( "Unimplemented or unknown handshake type!", TLSError.internal_error );
+ }
+
+ // Get set up for the next packet.
+ if (length+4<p.length) {
+ var n:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ n.writeBytes(p,length+4, p.length-(length+4));
+ return n;
+ } else {
+ return null;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Throw an error when the detected handshake state isn't a valid state for the given entity type (client vs. server, etc. ).
+ * This really should abort the handshake, since there's no case in which a server should EVER be confused about the type of entity it is. BP
+ */
+ private function notifyStateError( rec:ByteArray ) : void {
+ throw new TLSError( "Invalid handshake state for a TLS Entity type of " + _entity, TLSError.internal_error );
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * two unimplemented functions
+ */
+ private function parseClientKeyExchange( rec:ByteArray ) : void {
+ throw new TLSError( "ClientKeyExchange is currently unimplemented!", TLSError.internal_error );
+ }
+
+ private function parseServerKeyExchange( rec:ByteArray ) : void {
+ throw new TLSError( "ServerKeyExchange is currently unimplemented!", TLSError.internal_error );
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Test the server's Finished message for validity against the data we know about. Only slightly rewritten. BP
+ */
+ private function verifyHandshake( rec:ByteArray):void {
+ // Get the Finished message
+ var verifyData:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ // This, in the vain hope that noboby is using SSL 2 anymore
+ if (_securityParameters.version == SSLSecurityParameters.PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
+ rec.readBytes(verifyData, 0, 36); // length should be (in fact, better be) 16 + 20 (md5-size + sha1-size)
+ } else { // presuming TLS
+ rec.readBytes(verifyData, 0, 12);
+ }
+
+ var data:ByteArray = _securityParameters.computeVerifyData(1-_entity, _handshakePayloads);
+
+ if (ArrayUtil.equals(verifyData, data)) {
+ _state = STATE_READY;
+ dispatchEvent(new TLSEvent(TLSEvent.READY));
+ } else {
+ throw new TLSError("Invalid Finished mac.", TLSError.bad_record_mac);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // enforceClient/enforceServer removed in favor of state-driven function maps
+
+ /**
+ * Handle a HANDSHAKE_HELLO
+ */
+ private function parseHandshakeHello( rec:ByteArray ) : void {
+ if (_state != STATE_READY) {
+ trace("Received an HELLO_REQUEST before being in state READY. ignoring.");
+ return;
+ }
+ _handshakePayloads = new ByteArray;
+ startHandshake();
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Handle a HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
+ */
+ private function parseHandshakeClientKeyExchange(rec:ByteArray):void {
+ if (_securityParameters.useRSA) {
+ // skip 2 bytes for length.
+ var len:uint = rec.readShort();
+ var cipher:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ rec.readBytes(cipher, 0, len);
+ var preMasterSecret:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ _config.privateKey.decrypt(cipher, preMasterSecret, len);
+ _securityParameters.setPreMasterSecret(preMasterSecret);
+
+ // now is a good time to get our pending states
+ var o:Object = _securityParameters.getConnectionStates();
+ _pendingReadState = o.read;
+ _pendingWriteState = o.write;
+
+ } else {
+ throw new TLSError("parseHandshakeClientKeyExchange not implemented for DH modes.", TLSError.internal_error);
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Handle HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO - client-side
+ */
+ private function parseHandshakeServerHello( rec:IDataInput ) : void {
+
+ var ver:uint = rec.readShort();
+ if (ver != _securityParameters.version) {
+ throw new TLSError("Unsupported TLS version: "+ver.toString(16), TLSError.protocol_version);
+ }
+ var random:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ rec.readBytes(random, 0, 32);
+ var session_length:uint = rec.readByte();
+ var session:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ if (session_length > 0) {
+ // some implementations don't assign a session ID
+ rec.readBytes(session, 0, session_length);
+ }
+
+ _securityParameters.setCipher(rec.readShort());
+ _securityParameters.setCompression(rec.readByte());
+ _securityParameters.setServerRandom(random);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Handle HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO - server side
+ */
+ private function parseHandshakeClientHello( rec:IDataInput ) : void {
+ var ret:Object;
+ var ver:uint = rec.readShort();
+ if (ver != _securityParameters.version) {
+ throw new TLSError("Unsupported TLS version: "+ver.toString(16), TLSError.protocol_version);
+ }
+
+ var random:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ rec.readBytes(random, 0, 32);
+ var session_length:uint = rec.readByte();
+ var session:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ if (session_length > 0) {
+ // some implementations don't assign a session ID
+ rec.readBytes(session, 0, session_length);
+ }
+ var suites:Array = [];
+
+ var suites_length:uint = rec.readShort();
+ for (var i:uint=0;i<suites_length/2;i++) {
+ suites.push(rec.readShort());
+ }
+
+ var compressions:Array = [];
+
+ var comp_length:uint = rec.readByte();
+ for (i=0;i<comp_length;i++) {
+ compressions.push(rec.readByte());
+ }
+
+ ret = {random:random, session:session, suites:suites, compressions:compressions};
+
+ var sofar:uint = 2+32+1+session_length+2+suites_length+1+comp_length;
+ var extensions:Array = [];
+ if (sofar<length) {
+ // we have extensions. great.
+ var ext_total_length:uint = rec.readShort();
+ while (ext_total_length>0) {
+ var ext_type:uint = rec.readShort();
+ var ext_length:uint = rec.readShort();
+ var ext_data:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ rec.readBytes(ext_data, 0, ext_length);
+ ext_total_length -= 4+ext_length;
+ extensions.push({type:ext_type, length:ext_length, data:ext_data});
+ }
+ }
+ ret.ext = extensions;
+
+ sendServerHello(ret);
+ sendCertificate();
+ // TODO: Modify to handle case of requesting a certificate from the client, for "client authentication",
+ // and testing purposes, will probably never actually need it.
+ sendServerHelloDone();
+ }
+
+ private function sendClientHello():void {
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ // version - modified to support version attribute from ISecurityParameters
+ rec.writeShort(_securityParameters.version);
+ // random
+ var prng:Random = new Random;
+ var clientRandom:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ prng.nextBytes(clientRandom, 32);
+ _securityParameters.setClientRandom(clientRandom);
+ rec.writeBytes(clientRandom,0,32);
+ // session
+ rec.writeByte(32);
+ prng.nextBytes(rec, 32);
+ // Cipher suites
+ var cs:Array = _config.cipherSuites;
+ rec.writeShort(2* cs.length);
+ for (var i:int=0;i<cs.length;i++) {
+ rec.writeShort(cs[i]);
+ }
+ // Compression
+ cs = _config.compressions;
+ rec.writeByte(cs.length);
+ for (i=0;i<cs.length;i++) {
+ rec.writeByte(cs[i]);
+ }
+ // no extensions, yet.
+ rec.position = 0;
+ sendHandshake(HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO, rec.length, rec);
+ }
+
+ private function findMatch(a1:Array, a2:Array):int {
+ for (var i:int=0;i<a1.length;i++) {
+ var e:uint = a1[i];
+ if (a2.indexOf(e)>-1) {
+ return e;
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ private function sendServerHello(v:Object):void {
+ var cipher:int = findMatch(_config.cipherSuites, v.suites);
+ if (cipher == -1) {
+ throw new TLSError("No compatible cipher found.", TLSError.handshake_failure);
+ }
+ _securityParameters.setCipher(cipher);
+
+ var comp:int = findMatch(_config.compressions, v.compressions);
+ if (comp == 01) {
+ throw new TLSError("No compatible compression method found.", TLSError.handshake_failure);
+ }
+ _securityParameters.setCompression(comp);
+ _securityParameters.setClientRandom(v.random);
+
+
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ rec.writeShort(_securityParameters.version);
+ var prng:Random = new Random;
+ var serverRandom:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ prng.nextBytes(serverRandom, 32);
+ _securityParameters.setServerRandom(serverRandom);
+ rec.writeBytes(serverRandom,0,32);
+ // session
+ rec.writeByte(32);
+ prng.nextBytes(rec, 32);
+ // Cipher suite
+ rec.writeShort(v.suites[0]);
+ // Compression
+ rec.writeByte(v.compressions[0]);
+ rec.position = 0;
+ sendHandshake(HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO, rec.length, rec);
+ }
+
+ private var sendClientCert:Boolean = false;
+ private function setStateRespondWithCertificate( r:ByteArray = null) : void {
+ sendClientCert = true;
+ }
+
+ private function sendCertificate( r:ByteArray = null ):void {
+ var cert:ByteArray = _config.certificate;
+ var len:uint;
+ var len2:uint;
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ // Look for a certficate chain, if we have one, send it, if we don't, send an empty record.
+ if (cert != null) {
+ len = cert.length;
+ len2 = cert.length + 3;
+ rec.writeByte(len2>>16);
+ rec.writeShort(len2&65535);
+ rec.writeByte(len>>16);
+ rec.writeShort(len&65535);
+ rec.writeBytes(cert);
+ } else {
+ rec.writeShort( 0 );
+ rec.writeByte( 0 );
+ }
+ rec.position = 0;
+ sendHandshake(HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE, rec.length, rec);
+ }
+
+ private function sendCertificateVerify():void {
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray();
+ // Encrypt the handshake payloads here
+ var data:ByteArray = _securityParameters.computeCertificateVerify(_entity, _handshakePayloads);
+ data.position=0;
+ sendHandshake(HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, data.length, data);
+ }
+
+ private function sendServerHelloDone():void {
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ sendHandshake(HANDSHAKE_HELLO_DONE, rec.length, rec);
+ }
+
+ private function sendClientKeyExchange():void {
+ if (_securityParameters.useRSA) {
+ var p:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ p.writeShort(_securityParameters.version);
+ var prng:Random = new Random;
+ prng.nextBytes(p, 46);
+ p.position = 0;
+
+ var preMasterSecret:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ preMasterSecret.writeBytes(p, 0, p.length);
+ preMasterSecret.position = 0;
+ _securityParameters.setPreMasterSecret(preMasterSecret);
+
+ var enc_key:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ _otherCertificate.getPublicKey().encrypt(preMasterSecret, enc_key, preMasterSecret.length);
+
+ enc_key.position = 0;
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+
+ // TLS requires the size of the premaster key be sent BUT
+ // SSL 3.0 does not
+ if (_securityParameters.version > 0x0300) {
+ rec.writeShort(enc_key.length);
+ }
+ rec.writeBytes(enc_key, 0, enc_key.length);
+
+ rec.position=0;
+
+ sendHandshake(HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, rec.length, rec);
+
+ // now is a good time to get our pending states
+ var o:Object = _securityParameters.getConnectionStates();
+ _pendingReadState = o.read;
+ _pendingWriteState = o.write;
+
+ } else {
+ throw new TLSError("Non-RSA Client Key Exchange not implemented.", TLSError.internal_error);
+ }
+ }
+ private function sendFinished():void {
+ var data:ByteArray = _securityParameters.computeVerifyData(_entity, _handshakePayloads);
+ data.position=0;
+ sendHandshake(HANDSHAKE_FINISHED, data.length, data);
+ }
+
+ private function sendHandshake(type:uint, len:uint, payload:IDataInput):void {
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ rec.writeByte(type);
+ rec.writeByte(0);
+ rec.writeShort(len);
+ payload.readBytes(rec, rec.position, len);
+ _handshakePayloads.writeBytes(rec, 0, rec.length);
+ sendRecord(PROTOCOL_HANDSHAKE, rec);
+ }
+
+ private function sendChangeCipherSpec():void {
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ rec[0] = 1;
+ sendRecord(PROTOCOL_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rec);
+
+ // right after, switch the cipher for writing.
+ _currentWriteState = _pendingWriteState;
+ _pendingWriteState = null;
+ }
+
+ public function sendApplicationData(data:ByteArray, offset:uint=0, length:uint=0):void {
+ var rec:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ var len:uint = length;
+ // BIG FAT WARNING: Patch from Arlen Cuss ALA As3crypto group on Google code.
+ // This addresses data overflow issues when the packet size hits the max length boundary.
+ if (len == 0) len = data.length;
+ while (len>16384) {
+ rec.position = 0;
+ rec.writeBytes(data, offset, 16384);
+ rec.position = 0;
+ sendRecord(PROTOCOL_APPLICATION_DATA, rec);
+ offset += 16384;
+ len -= 16384;
+ }
+ rec.position = 0;
+ rec.writeBytes(data, offset, len);
+ // trace("Data I'm sending..." + Hex.fromArray( data ));
+ rec.position = 0;
+ sendRecord(PROTOCOL_APPLICATION_DATA, rec);
+ }
+ private function sendRecord(type:uint, payload:ByteArray):void {
+ // encrypt
+ payload = _currentWriteState.encrypt(type, payload);
+
+ _oStream.writeByte(type);
+ _oStream.writeShort(_securityParameters.version);
+ _oStream.writeShort(payload.length);
+ _oStream.writeBytes(payload, 0, payload.length);
+
+ scheduleWrite();
+ }
+
+ private var _writeScheduler:uint;
+ private function scheduleWrite():void {
+ if (_writeScheduler!=0) return;
+ _writeScheduler = setTimeout(commitWrite, 0);
+ }
+ private function commitWrite():void {
+ clearTimeout(_writeScheduler);
+ _writeScheduler = 0;
+ if (_state != STATE_CLOSED) {
+ dispatchEvent(new ProgressEvent(ProgressEvent.SOCKET_DATA));
+ }
+ }
+
+ private function sendClientAck( rec:ByteArray ):void {
+ if ( _handshakeCanContinue ) {
+ // If I have a pending cert request, send it
+ if (sendClientCert)
+ sendCertificate();
+ // send a client key exchange
+ sendClientKeyExchange();
+ // Send the certificate verify, if we have one
+ if (_config.certificate != null)
+ sendCertificateVerify();
+ // send a change cipher spec
+ sendChangeCipherSpec();
+ // send a finished
+ sendFinished();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Vaguely gross function that parses a RSA key out of a certificate.
+ *
+ * As long as that certificate looks just the way we expect it to.
+ *
+ */
+ private function loadCertificates( rec:ByteArray ):void {
+ var tmp:uint = rec.readByte();
+ var certs_len:uint = (tmp<<16) | rec.readShort();
+ var certs:Array = [];
+
+ while (certs_len>0) {
+ tmp = rec.readByte();
+ var cert_len:uint = (tmp<<16) | rec.readShort();
+ var cert:ByteArray = new ByteArray;
+ rec.readBytes(cert, 0, cert_len);
+ certs.push(cert);
+ certs_len -= 3 + cert_len;
+ }
+
+ var firstCert:X509Certificate = null;
+ for (var i:int=0;i<certs.length;i++) {
+ var x509:X509Certificate = new X509Certificate(certs[i]);
+ _store.addCertificate(x509);
+ if (firstCert==null) {
+ firstCert = x509;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ // Test first for trust override parameters
+ // This nice trust override stuff comes from Joey Parrish via As3crypto forums
+ var certTrusted:Boolean;
+ if (_config.trustAllCertificates) {
+ certTrusted = true; // Blatantly trust everything
+ } else if (_config.trustSelfSignedCertificates ) {
+ // Self-signed certs
+ certTrusted = firstCert.isSelfSigned(new Date);
+ } else {
+ // Certs with a signer in the CA store - realistically, I should setup an event chain to handle this
+ certTrusted = firstCert.isSigned(_store, _config.CAStore );
+ }
+
+ // Good so far
+ if (certTrusted) {
+ // ok, that's encouraging. now for the hostname match.
+ if (_otherIdentity==null || _config.ignoreCommonNameMismatch ) {
+ // we don't care who we're talking with. groovy.
+ _otherCertificate = firstCert;
+ } else {
+ // use regex to handle wildcard certs
+ var commonName:String = firstCert.getCommonName();
+ // replace all regex special characters with escaped version, except for asterisk
+ // replace the asterisk with a regex sequence to match one or more non-dot characters
+ var commonNameRegex:RegExp = new RegExp( commonName.replace(/[\^\\\-$.[\]|()?+{}]/g, "\\$&").replace(/\*/g, "[^.]+"), "gi");
+ if (commonNameRegex.exec(_otherIdentity)) {
+ _otherCertificate = firstCert;
+ } else {
+ if (_config.promptUserForAcceptCert ) {
+ _handshakeCanContinue = false;
+ dispatchEvent( new TLSEvent( TLSEvent.PROMPT_ACCEPT_CERT ));
+ } else {
+ throw new TLSError("Invalid common name: "+firstCert.getCommonName()+", expected "+_otherIdentity, TLSError.bad_certificate);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ // Let's ask the user if we can accept this cert. I'm not certain of the behaviour in case of timeouts,
+ // so I probably need to handle the case by killing and restarting the connection rather than continuing if it becomes
+ // an issue. We shall see. BP
+ if (_config.promptUserForAcceptCert) {
+ _handshakeCanContinue = false;
+ dispatchEvent( new TLSEvent( TLSEvent.PROMPT_ACCEPT_CERT ));
+ } else {
+ // Cannot continue, die.
+ throw new TLSError("Cannot verify certificate", TLSError.bad_certificate);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Accept the peer cert, and keep going
+ public function acceptPeerCertificate() : void {
+ _handshakeCanContinue = true;
+ sendClientAck( null );
+ }
+
+ // Step off biotch! No trust for you!
+ public function rejectPeerCertificate() : void {
+ throw new TLSError("Peer certificate not accepted!", TLSError.bad_certificate);
+ }
+
+
+ private function parseAlert(p:ByteArray):void {
+ //throw new Error("Alert not implemented.");
+ // 7.2
+ trace("GOT ALERT! type="+p[1]);
+ close();
+ }
+ private function parseChangeCipherSpec(p:ByteArray):void {
+ p.readUnsignedByte();
+ if (_pendingReadState==null) {
+ throw new TLSError("Not ready to Change Cipher Spec, damnit.", TLSError.unexpected_message);
+ }
+ _currentReadState = _pendingReadState;
+ _pendingReadState = null;
+ // 7.1
+ }
+ private function parseApplicationData(p:ByteArray):void {
+ if (_state != STATE_READY) {
+ throw new TLSError("Too soon for data!", TLSError.unexpected_message);
+ return;
+ }
+ dispatchEvent(new TLSEvent(TLSEvent.DATA, p));
+ }
+
+ private function handleTLSError(e:TLSError):void {
+ // basic rules to keep things simple:
+ // - Make a good faith attempt at notifying peers
+ // - TLSErrors are always fatal.
+ // BP: Meh...not always. Common Name mismatches appear to be common on servers. Instead of closing, let's pause, and ask for confirmation
+ // before we tear the connection down.
+
+ close(e);
+ }
+ }
+}